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ABSTRACT: The article looks at the current restructuring of Italian Welfare putting it into perspective with 
both the structural contradictions of contemporary capitalism and the more contingent and specific condi-
tions of contemporary Italy. Relying on the approach taken by the political economy of the Welfare State, 
the variegated neoliberalization studies and the concept of référentiel, the process is considered and ana-
lysed both in its semiotic and material elements. Looking at the transformations of the key-actors in the 
pre-crisis Welfare Mix arrangement, an on-going entrepreneurial and financial change is identified, open-
ing the door to two, complementary, scenarios: a smart-utopia private Welfare one for those able to pay 
and a repressive residual Welfare state for the poor.  
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Since the 2008 financial crisis, neoliberal ideas and policies have experienced a lack 
of legitimacy. This has opened the door to a new round of quests for hegemony, mean-
ing a process which is both material and semiotic and must always “be worked on, 
maintained, renewed and revised” (Hall 2011). The end of neoliberalism had been 
forecasted many times before and every time reality proved such prophecies wrong. 
The neoliberal project has proven to be remarkably adaptable and able “not only to 
survive, but to gain further momentum through the exploitation of crisis conditions for 
which it is often largely responsible” (Peck, Theodore, Brenner 2013).  
If this is true, it is crucial to analyse and decipher – on semiotic grounds – the processes 
of elaboration and affirmation of new “référentiels” for public policy (Jobert, Muller 
1987) and –  on material grounds – the processes of de-regulation, re-regulation and 
the opening up of new spaces for market rule and capital accumulation. 
In the current phase of fiscal crisis and national and “urban austerity” (Peck 2012), 
the Welfare State1 is particularly suitable for such analysis: on the one hand the fiscal 
crisis of the State is claimed to be due to overinflated public spending, of which Wel-
fare is a part; on the other, social policy is increasingly considered as a new field for 
private investment and profitmaking (Salamon 2014), where the invisible hand of the 
market seems to go together with its invisible heart (G8 Task Force 2014).  
As I focus on the Italian case, my main theoretical references are the concept of ré-
férentiel (Jobert, Muller 1987) for the analysis of the semiotic dimension of the restruc-
turing of the Welfare State and the political economy of the Welfare state (Gough 
1979, 2008) and studies on variegated neoliberalization (Peck, Tickell, 2002; Brenner, 
Theodore, Peck, 2010; Peck, 2012) for the analysis of its material dimension. My aim is 
to bring an innovative approach to the study of Italian Welfare2 and to enrich the liter-
ature on variegated neoliberalization through an analysis of a new geographical and 
institutional context.  
 
1 The Welfare State includes a wide and diverse set of norms, tools and actors. Referring to the classical 
distinction between economic benefits and social services, I will focus on the latter in the article. 
2 Throughout this article I will refer to major scholars and to different approaches in the study of Italian 
Welfare, partly relying on them for data and interpretations, in order to build up my own understanding of 
its evolution. Although I do not directly engage in a dialogue with this literature, my approach is in an indi-
rect dialogue with three major streams of debate on Italian Welfare: 1) it provides a new interpretation for 
the lack of social and political voice that poverty and Welfare issues have had in the past three decades 
(Gori, Ghetti, Rusmini and Tidoli 2014); 2) it enriches the debate about “what is public” (Bifulco, Borghi, De 
Leonardis, Vitale 2005) with the discussion of new data and trends; 3) it questions the interpretation of the 
current restructuring in terms of “post-neoliberal, neo-welfarist” arrangement (Ferrera 2013). 




The discussion will develop as follows: I will begin by discussing the intertwined cri-
ses of capitalism and Welfare State, showing the contribution of the political economy 
of the Welfare State and variegated neoliberalization to the debate (section 2). I will 
then move to an empirical perspective, summarising the most critical features of the 
development of the Italian Welfare State up to 2008 (section 3). In section 4 and 5, I 
will show how the crisis, far from being just a “destructive” moment in the history of 
Welfare Capitalism, is a very productive and creative moment for the emergence of 
new actors and paradigms and for the implementation of processes of re-regulation 
and further market influence. Finally (section 6), I will outline this article’s contribu-
tions to existing theories and suggest two complementary scenarios for the further de-
velopment of Italian Welfare. 
 
 
2. Welfare crisis and capitalist crisis 
 
In order to frame the current Welfare crisis within the wider picture of contempo-
rary economic and social dynamics, it is useful to focus on the relationship between 
Welfare and capitalism. This relationship is at the core of classical works in social sci-
ence both looking at their different regional-institutional (Esping Andersen 1990) and 
historical (Castel 1995) arrangements. The same is true for the discussion of their inter-
twined crises, given that the “crisis of the Welfare State” has been debated in political 
and academic arenas since the mid Seventies, when the “fiscal crisis of the State” and a 
new “crisis” of contemporary capitalism were first diagnosed (O’Connor 1973, OECD 
1981). 
Crises and paradigm shifts in the field of Welfare policies are at the core of a recent 
overview of transformations of European Welfare States by the French sociologist and 
political scientist Bruno Palier, where the author identifies and discusses three Welfare 
paradigms: redistributive Keynesian (KWS), competitive neoliberal (NWS) and emerging 
Social Investment (SIWS) paradigms. For each, Palier stresses specific diagnoses of so-
cial problems; specific ideas about the relationship between economy and social poli-
cies; specific principles, values and norms underpinning public policy and, finally, spe-
cific policy tools (Palier 2013). The KWS paradigm aimed at full employment and pur-
sued demand-side support policies through direct intervention in the economic and so-
cial field; it produced a massive de-commodification of Welfare services, with conse-
quent private prosperity generating high levels of consumption. Against this model, the 
neoliberal paradigm followed the road of transforming labor conditions in more flexi-
ble and precarious terms, cutting public budgets and leaving little room for Welfare 




services. From this viewpoint, personal wellbeing derives from participation in the la-
bor market and from the implementation of private strategies of risk-management, 
e.g.  entering into private insurance contracts to cover healthcare and pensions. Finally, 
the emerging Social Investment paradigm brings a positive consideration of social poli-
cy back into the debate through the idea of “human capital”, but it frames it within the 
neoliberal macro-economic model of public budget control.  
Since the mid ‘70s the crisis of KWS has been diagnosed from different theoretical 
and political perspectives, while older critics renewed their popularity: liberal strands 
of critical thought focused on its effects in terms of a “colonisation of the public realm 
by private interests”, removing responsibility from the poor, and an unsustainable 
growth in public budgets. Other critics, drawing on the experience of the new social 
movements, pointed at its bureaucratic and authoritarian nature, at its growing dis-
tance from everyday experience and needs and at its self-referentiality. Profound 
transformations in the economic system and mode of production, demographic chang-
es, changes in gender relationships and in life-styles and life-cycles are all phenomena 
recalled in order to show the necessity of “going beyond” KWS (for an overview of the 
debate see Ferrera 1996; Colombo 2013).  
Moving from Palier’s overview, I suggest looking at the paradigm shifts from KWS to 
NWS to SIWS through the lens of political economy, in particular the political economy 
of the Welfare state (PEWS) and the variegated neoliberalization approaches. The for-
mer approach will allow me to set the shifts from KWS to NWS to SIWS into a longer 
historical and political process, while the latter will allow me to stress the continuity 
between NWS and SIWS. 
The PEWS approach dates back to the classical text, written by an English Marxist 
scholar at the end of the ’70s, sketching the political economy of the Welfare state and 
situating it within the trends of contemporary capitalism (Gough 1979). In his book, Ian 
Gough highlights two major contradictions in the contemporary Welfare State. The first 
contradiction is a functional and static one: it is the contradiction between Welfare as a 
tool for capitalist growth and Welfare as a hard-fought conquest of workers against the 
logic of capitalist accumulation. While Gough develops this first contradiction in both 
historical and sociological terms, I will mainly focus on the second contradiction, i.e. 
the specific form that the former takes in the last quarter of the 20th century. Drawing 
on O’Connor’s theory of the fiscal crisis of the State (O’Connor 1973), Gough stresses 
the contradiction between Welfare as a necessity and Welfare as an unsustainable cost 
for contemporary capitalism. The argument is based on empirical data showing the 
constant growth of public budgets throughout the 20th century and particularly after 
the Second World War. Gough explains this growth using both economic and political 




arguments and I will focus here on the latter: the growing power of the working class 
and the fear of the “communist threat” as perceived by Cold War western political 
élites. Under these major pressures, western governments were pushed to adopt a 
number of measures to ensure greater social protection for the working class – or at 
least for its more organised segments. In this context, the growth of Welfare budgets 
was driven by four factors: 1) the highly labor-intensive and time-consuming nature of 
social work; 2) a demographic transition leading to a growth in the non-active and a 
decrease in the active population; 3) a quantitative and qualitative increase in services; 
4) the complexity of keeping costs under control caused both by qualitative (inefficien-
cy) and quantitative reasons (the potentially limitless nature of social needs  for which 
the State could claim responsibility).  
Developing his argument, Gough assesses the crisis of the Keynesian macro-
economic model and the rise of Monetarism, documenting the strategies put in place 
in order to reduce Welfare budgets in the UK, based on tax reforms and fiscal centrali-
sation. In doing so, the author identifies several problems that these cuts were likely to 
produce for the stability of a capitalist society: 1) the socially unsustainable outcomes 
resulting from the combination of economic crisis (i.e. growing social needs) and Wel-
fare cuts (i.e. less resources for social services and benefits); 2) the crisis that would 
probably affect those economic sectors, such as housing and construction, that are 
highly dependent on public economic support. On these bases, Gough suggests that a 
qualitative restructuring of Keynesian Welfare State is to be expected, one that re-
shapes Welfare policies according to contemporary capitalist needs. Finally he offers 
four examples of such a possible reshaping: 1) closer links between education and vo-
cational training; 2) a blurring of the boundaries between Welfare recipients and work-
ers, with the introduction of compulsory temporary work for the former; 3) a "manage-
rialisation", standardisation and centralisation of Welfare services; 4) a re-commodi-
fication and re-privatisation of Welfare services.  
While a mix of these trends has been present in almost every policy debate on Wel-
fare since the mid Seventies, especially under the flag of recalibration (Ferrera, Hemer-
ijck, Rhodes 2000; Ascoli, Pavolini 2015), what I emphasize about the PEWS approach is 
its strong link between the transformation of capitalism and transformations in Wel-
fare. In so doing, I follow the PEWS refusal to read social and even demographic trends 
as pure, natural, facts, but I insist on the need to see them in relation to a structural 
transformation of the modes and relations of production within contemporary capital-
ism. 
For this purpose, I rely upon the most recent conceptualisations of neoliberalism and 
neoliberalization, elaborated in order to avoid the risk of its degeneration into a “rascal 




concept” (Brenner, Peck, Theodore 2010). For this purpose I embrace the definition of 
neoliberalization as the “context of contexts” into which complex and contradictory 
processes of de-regulation/rollback and re-regulation/rollout take place. Within this 
view neoliberalization is defined, in its broader meaning, as a “politically guided inten-
sification of market rule and commodification” (idem) and presents four features: 1) it 
is not a “state” or a stable condition, but a complex interaction of interconnected ele-
ments leading to a market-driven and market-oriented transformation of existing regu-
latory regimes; 2) it is not the pure application of an ideal neoliberal economic theory 
but its hybrid and constitutively incomplete, experimental and polymorphic translation; 
3) it does not imply the disappearance of the State but its highly selective mobilisation 
in order to facilitate the extension and intensification of processes of commodification; 
4) it is path-dependent and geographically uneven (idem). Thus, contrary to common 
criticism, geographical, institutional and historical differentiations are not blind spots in 
this theoretical approach but some of its core objects. 
Crucial in this perspective is the articulation between rollback and rollout moments 
in neoliberalization, i.e. between its destructive and its creative moment. While the 
former is characterised by a disarticulation of existing regulative arrangements, the lat-
ter distinctively features the development, experimentation and stabilisation of new 
regulative frameworks. The two moments are strictly interconnected and sometimes 
hard to untangle; furthermore, their temporality is not linear but circular and the na-
ture and circumstances of their relationship is highly path-dependant (Peck, Tickell 
2002; Moini 2015). From a historical point of view, the authors use the category of 
rollback/roll out in order to discriminate chronologically between three phases of ne-
oliberalization. The first, qualified as the phase of uneven development of neoliberali-
zation (Brenner, Peck, Theodore 2010), goes from the mid ‘70s to the mid ’90s and it is 
mainly a rollback moment, one of disarticulation of existing regulative arrangements 
and very selective and partial experimentation of new ones. It is a destructive phase, 
resulting from the combination of an acute conjuncture crisis in capital accumulation 
and a strong cultural and political mobilisation of economic elites. It encompasses pri-
vatisation of some key assets and a destabilisation of capital-labour relations but no 
comprehensive alternative regulative frames were elaborated or implemented. (Galli-
no 2012).  
In response to the dramatic social effects of this crisis and its political management, 
a second phase took shape, namely the rollout moment, characterised by the neoliber-
alization of uneven regulatory development (Brenner, Peck, Theodore 2010). Promoted 
by Centre-Left coalitions through the vehicular idea of the Third Way (MacLennan 
2004), it is characterised by a set of principles and policies that, without radically con-




testing the core of rollback neoliberalization, aim at mitigating its effects but also con-
tribute to their deeper incorporation into the political agenda and institutional ar-
rangements of Nation States and International Institutions. Thus, in the macro-
economic field we witness a combination of Austerity budget policies with a radical lib-
eralisation of financial markets (Economistes Atterrés 2011; Gallino 2012), in the social 
field the promotion of the paradigm of Social Investment (Morel, Palier, Palme 2012; 
Ferrera 2013) and the shift from public to private and communitarian responsibility 
(Lodemel, Moreira 2014, Moini 2013), and in the labor market a further diffusion of 
precariousness for both employees and the self-employed (Vanderbrucke, Cantillon 
2014, Saraceno 2015). This rollout phase is also characterised by a consolidation of 
global policy networks (with the circulation of policy recommendations, best practices, 
etc.) and the institutionalisation of a new regulatory regime with international institu-
tions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, European Commission, the 
G8 and G20 promoting new regulatory frames. 
A further development of these trends started short before the outbreak of the 
global financial crisis in 20007-2008 and gained extraordinary momentum throughout 
the crisis itself. British critical geographer Jamie Peck called this phase "Austerity Ur-
banism, or rollout neoliberalism’s very own rollback moment", meaning by that the re-
turn of deregulation, deconstruction and downsizing, following "Third Way" rollout 
regulatory frames (Peck 2012).  
Moving from economic processes to their social impacts, one should notice that 
since the mid ‘70s, the combination of the crisis of capitalist accumulation and the cri-
sis of the Welfare State led to the emergence of a “new social question” (Castel 1995). 
The distinctive feature of this new social question is its push towards mass destabilisa-
tion, recalling the impact of the first wave of industrialisation, when precariousness of 
life and labor conditions hit not (only) the marginalised but the vast majority of the 
workforce. The shift from the “full employment” model to that of “full employability”, 
together with the absolute freedom of movement of capital, made it necessary for the 
workforce to become flexible and ever more compliant with the changing needs of 
production in terms of hours, skills and working conditions. As a consequence, the 
number of “working poor” within the EU has dramatically increased, leading to a situa-
tion where “work is not enough” (Saraceno 2015). Beside this “destabilisation of the 
stable” (Castel 1995), another important process took place, namely an increase in the 
number of marginalised people, the “wasted lives” expelled from the labour market 
with no obvious chance of getting back into it (Bauman 2004). Their marginalisation is 
greater as it involves all the major fields of social life in the modern capitalist State: not 
only the labor field, but also that of political representation (with the crisis of mass po-




litical parties and the rise in the number of working-class non-voters) and military mo-
bilisation (with the shift from national service to the smaller and more effective profes-
sional army) (idem, Quadrelli 2013).  
 
 
3. Crisis and Welfare in Italy 
 
Italy is particularly suitable for investigation into the post-2007-2008 crisis neoliber-
alization of Welfare for at least two reasons: firstly, it is part of debt ridden Southern-
European countries facing hard austerity measures in the context of a European trend 
towards north-south polarization (Boisson-Cohen, Mareuge, Marguerit, Palier 2015); 
secondly, its (historically weak) Welfare system has a close historical link to a wide set 
of non-governmental organizations, which is now grouped under the label of “Third 
Sector” and plays a major role in the current restructuring.   
Before going into detail concerning the post-crisis restructuring it is necessary to 
summarise the main transformations within the Italian Welfare State in the previous 
two decades. First of all, Italian Welfare was, and still is, part of the Southern European 
model characterised by the key role played by family and community networks, com-
pared to the State, in ensuring the social protection of individuals (Esping-Andersen 
1990; Ferrera 1996).  
Secondly, some chronological clarifications are needed. Compared to the roll-
back/rollout model, the Italian Welfare State presents some specific features: it devel-
oped, as result of the social struggles of the ‘60s and ‘70s, in the second half of the 
‘70s. As a consequence, Italy arrived relatively “late” in the process of rollback neolib-
eralization, the ’80s being a decade of both partial implementation and stagnation of 
inclusive social reforms, due to the changed social and political situation. It is also the 
phase during which part of the social and political engagement of the preceding dec-
ade turned into experimental initiatives responding to new and urgent social needs 
such as the spread of mass unemployment and drug abuse. The emergence and devel-
opment of these initiatives, under the flag of volontariato (voluntary work), prepared 
the field for the emergence, in the ’90s, of its more professional and entrepreneurial 
and less politicised version, the “Third Sector” (Marcon 2004; Quadrelli 2013; Busso, 
Gargiulo 2016). Since the mid ‘80s, the State has increasingly devolved responsibility 
for implementing part of public social policies to volunteer organisations through in-
formal arrangements. This phase of mutual arrangement (Ascoli, Ranci 2003) was fol-
lowed in the ‘90s by a more institutionalised set of relationships between the Third 
Sector and the State. A key role in accelerating this transition was played by the Euro-




pean Union: on the one hand, in order to respect the financial norms of its Treaties, the 
Italian State entered a deep fiscal crisis which was politically managed through massive 
privatisation and by stopping the creation of further  places in the Public Sector, lead-
ing to further outsourcing in the Third Sector; on the other hand,  its legislation on free 
market competition among private providers forced Italy to better define the process 
and nature of its collaboration between the State and the Third Sector. However, both 
the State Administration and the Third Sector resisted these moves towards free com-
petition and rapidly turned them into a system of regulated competition that left a high 
degree of discretion to Local Administrations over the choice of Third Sector contrac-
tors (idem). In this context, a turning point in Welfare regulation came in 2000, with 
the promulgation of Law 328/00 on Social Assistance, introducing for the first time 
since 1890 a new and comprehensive law on the subject (Madama 2010). The Law was 
based on some fundamental principles such as subsidiarity between both Central and 
Local State and public and private actors and the necessity for national standards for 
social rights (Gori 2004). As a whole, Welfare provision in the decades from the mid 
’80s to the mid first decade of the 2000s was characterised by an increasing institu-
tionalisation of the Third Sector and increasing (although insufficient and below the UE 
average) social expense (Gori et al. 2014). When in 2008-2009, Italy was first hit by the 
crisis, its Welfare State system was in a very critical condition, illustrated by the follow-
ing six points (Gori et al. 2014; Ferrera 2013; Moro 2013).  
 
1. Lack of a universal scheme against poverty  
2. Lack of national standards for social rights  
3. High fragmentation of existing social benefits, both in terms of categories 
of recipients and in terms of geographical inconsistency (with a major 
North-South divide and great differences within both North and South) 
(idem) 
4. Predominance of an allocation for individual benefits over that for public 
services, notwithstanding a long list of policy recommendations aimed at 
balancing this ratio 
5. Insufficient financial consistency, particularly at the local level, where it 
had been stagnating or even decreasing for the past 20 years, while local 
responsibility for social policies had increased dramatically since 2001  
6. Increasing institutionalisation of the role of non-public actors, especially 
the Third Sector, playing a substitute role with regard to the State 
Since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007-2008, the national system has un-
dergone a process of creative destruction, combining elements of de-regulation and re-




regulation. The whole process has been driven by two acute and intertwined crises: a 
fiscal crisis within the Italian State as a consequence of the political management of the 
global financial crisis, and a crisis within the Italian political élite as a consequence of a 
high degree of corruption and popular discredit. This double crisis is best illustrated by 
election, between 2011 and 2014, by the Italian Parliament of three different govern-
ments led by different Prime Ministers (Sen. Mario Monti, On. Enrico Letta, PM Matteo 
Renzi). What is particularly significant is that, although quite different in political biog-
raphies, rhetorics and orientation, each of them claimed his legitimacy came not from 
direct elections nor from political affiliation, but on the one hand from their commit-
ment to overturn the public deficit, and on the other from their and their ministers’ 
“direct relationship” with civil society and the Third Sector. 
In this context strong measures have been adopted since 2008 in order to re-
centralise key financial responsibilities (Corte dei Conti 2015)3, the national budget for 
Welfare programs has undergone major cuts (-91% between 2008 and 2012) and some 
specific Funds were completely removed, with dramatic consequences for the popula-
tion and for Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs) working as state contractors (Gori et al. 
2014). These cuts had major effects on the quantity and quality of Welfare services be-
cause they occurred in the same 5 year period when the number of people living in a 
state of absolute poverty doubled (Istat 2015). More specifically they implied: 1) an in-
crease in the number of people excluded from access to Welfare services (Idem); an 
exclusive focus of Welfare services on the most urgent situations (Ghetti 2012, Ghetti, 
Gori 2012; Caritas Italiana 2014); 3) an increase in outsourcing to the Third Sector, of-
ten though all-time low bids (Auser 2012, Caritas Italiana 2014). 
According to Ghetti and Gori, such a condition opens the door to a further reduction 
in the  capacity to both govern and provide Welfare services and to their partial substi-
tution by the action of private actors. At the same time, discretion and inequality in ac-
cess to Welfare services and benefits increase, and a late and partial taking-charge by 
Welfare services is experienced by Welfare recipients (Ghetti, Gori 2012). In this con-
text, the lack of a universal scheme to counter poverty and the lack of national stand-
ards for social protection are transforming access by the poor to basic forms of social 
protection into a dependent variable in “austere” public budgets. According to two in-
fluential scholars, however, this post-2008 crisis is nothing but a further step in Italian 
pre-crisis Welfare policy, a policy that – they conclude –  has turned Italy in one of the 
few European Countries in which no real recalibration process has occurred since the 
 
3 For a critical, non-academic perspective, see also Attac 2015 




‘90s, while the term “reforms” has simply masked a process of State retrenchment (As-
coli, Pavolini 2012).  
However, in next few paragraphs I suggest considering these cuts only as the more 
destructive, rollback moment of a wider process, while I stress the need for paying 
great attention to its creative moment which, since 2011, has been nurtured by a re-
markable public and private impetus in the restructuring of both the cultural and policy 
dimensions of the Italian Welfare State.  
 
 
4. Semiotic restructuring 
 
I will explore the semiotic dimension of this creative moment through an analysis of 
a number of documents in which scholars, consultants and scholar/consultants in the 
field of Welfare discuss the future of Italian Welfare in the context of the global finan-
cial crisis (Fosti 2013; Mulgan 2013; Maino and Ferrera 2013; Salamon 2014; Venturi, 
Zandonai 2014)4. In the analysis, I use the concept of référentiel developed by Jobert 
and Muller (Jobert and Muller 1987, Moini 2012, 2013). According to these authors, 
the référentiel is “the cognitive and normative representation of a policy and (…) it in-
corporates the visions of the world underpinning public policy” (Moini 2013). Any poli-
cy, from this point of view, is made up of three elements: an understanding of the 
question it addresses, a picture of the social group or the sector involved (thus contrib-
uting through performance to its very existence) and a theory of social change. It is 
therefore fundamental to focus on the connection between policies, discourses and in-
terests, thus considering both the linguistic dimension and social contexts and actors of 
public policy. The approach thus aims at analysing the process through which a social 
group builds a vision of the world that allows it (as well as other social groups sharing 
the same “universe of meaning”) to find its place in the world (Muller 1995, p. 157). 
While I will present the actors leading this process in next paragraph, here I will fol-
low the methodological suggestion of Jobert and Muller and I will deconstruct the réfé-
rentiel into four elements: values, norms, algorithms and images. Values express the 
overall vision of what is right and what is wrong, norms are guides for social and politi-
 
4 The documents are selected on the basis of their authors’ relevance in the debate and implementation of 
post-crisis Italian Welfare. A comprehensive analysis of the field of research and consultancy in Italy, allow-
ing me to better situate the selected documents in a wider picture, is not present in the literature yet. For 
an attempt in this direction, see Caselli 2016. 




cal action, algorithms describe causal relation among events and images offer a clear 
synthesis of the first three elements. 
As for values, the documents insist on the idea that the “traditional” Welfare state is 
over, although they give very little space to any explanation of the fact. At the same 
time, they stress that the need for social protection is growing in the context of the 
global economic crisis and they state that scholars, like society as a whole, are now fac-
ing a dramatic choice. Their scientific orientation also immediately becomes a political 
one: a choice between a disastrous withdrawal of the State and its virtuous re-
invention. Overcoming the public-private antithesis is definitely the main emerging val-
ue, underpinned by the moral imperative of choosing between re-invention and death. 
“Win-Win” arrangements are within reach, “philantropication thru privatisation” has 
already occurred and is even more necessary in times of a fiscal crisis in States (Sala-
mon 2014). Together with this, another cultural shift is required: the adoption of a 
clear Social-Investment oriented policy agenda: Welfare must be activating and pursue 
the ideal of equality of chances. 
Referring to norms, two clear directions emerge from the documents: the adoption 
of a New Public Governance approach and a stimulus to the growth of social entrepre-
neurship. The New Public Governance approach, derived from Public Administration 
and Management studies, pushes for a new transformation in the role of the State, and 
in that of Local Government in particular. Public actors should directly intervene only 
as extrema ratio and should instead take up the new role of “network managers”, “re-
sources poolers” and trust facilitators within networks composed of public, non-profit 
and for-profit actors, finally considered as partners (Pestoff 2012; Fosti, 2013)5. Com-
plementary to this shift in the role of the State, is a shift in the organisation and busi-
ness strategies of the Third Sector: the quantitative and qualitative growth of NPOs and 
different forms of social entrepreneurship is therefore critical for solving the epochal 
issues of poverty, unemployment and an ageing population in innovative ways. The 
opening of new “social” markets and the development of “impact finance” are part of 
this wider transformation.  
Looking at algorithms, we can find three, starting from the most generic according to 
which if we don’t accept the challenge of change, citizens will lose their social rights. As 
already mentioned, we are concerned with very generic statements that force the 
reader to take a strong, moral position. Going more into detail, we encounter the sec-
ond algorithm, affirming that if all social actors, no matter if public or private, contrib-
 
5 For a systematic application of the model in the Italian Case, see the Plan for Welfare Development re-
cently put in place by the city of Milan (Comune di Milano, 2012). For a more theoretical approach, again 
applied to the Italian case, see Fosti, 2013. For a critical discussion of this approach, see Gori, 2013  




ute to Welfare, we will have more and more effective rights. This second statement, 
again quite generic, focuses on the need to abandon opposing ideological positions 
(thus also defining what is ideological and what is not) and to strengthen a harmonic 
and collaborative image of “the challenge” that we all need to take up. Finally, if the 
Welfare system takes on a more entrepreneurial attitude, society as a whole will bene-
fit, suggesting the adoption of an entrepreneurial and self-entrepreneurial attitude (by 
Third Sector’s CEOs, social workers and the poor) as a key for getting out of the crisis. 
As for images, a major one – typical of shock politics and economy (Klein 2007) – is 
that of the end of the world as we knew it. Everything has changed and there is no time 
to discuss too much how this happened or who is responsible. Our categories of per-
ception are overtaken by this dramatic transformation and we now have to face this 
decision: change, transformation or death. So if you don’t have the keys and a good 
recipe for this transformation, you’d better shut up and leave the matter to the ex-
perts. The second image is about the coming of a new era, quite contradictorily de-
scribed as post-capitalistic and genuinely capitalistic, illustrated by the end of the pow-
er of the parasite locust and the coming of the entrepreneurial bees. In this scenario, 
future economic growth, will express “capitalism at its best”, rewarding hard work and 
innovation: smartness, social innovation and non-public actors are crucial elements of 
this process (Mulgan 2013). Finally, a third relevant image, constituting the emergent 
référentiel for the new Welfare system, is that of the hybrid. Its importance comes 
from its ability to define the contradiction between the post-capitalistic and genuine 
capitalistic future suggested by the entrepreneurial bees. Hybridisation, sometimes 
called cross-fertilisation, is the new keyword for NPOs trying to forge a new alliance 
with the For-Profit and financial sector (Venturi, Zandonai 2014).  
 
 
5. Material restructuring 
 
Having identified the emergent référentiel of the current restructuring of Italian 
Welfare, it is now crucial to look at the main creative strategies deployed by a number 
of public and private actors at different scales (Peck 2002; Kazepov 2010). I will analyse 
the strategies put forward by two important international institutions such as the EU 
and the G8, the Italian State, the Third Sector and the financial sector and I will show 
that there is a significant convergence among them in promoting new regulatory ar-
rangements that would translate the above mentioned values, norms, algorithms and 
images into actual social processes.  
 




5.1 International institutions 
 
Notable initiatives have been carried on since 2011 by two key actors of the current 
multi-scalar rule regime: the European Union and the G8. Looking at the former, the 
most important issue that must be taken into account is its limited power of interven-
tion in the field of Welfare (Kvist, Saari 2007; Graziano, Jacquot, Palier 2011). Nonethe-
less, the EU has indirectly intervened in the field of Welfare through actions and initia-
tives aimed at strengthening the Third Sector as the Social Business Initiative (SBI), 
launched in 2011 by the European Commission, aimed at “creating a favourable cli-
mate for social enterprises, key stakeholders in the social economy and innovation” 
(European Commission 2011). The initiative is set in the framework of the Horizon 
2020 Strategy for “smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” (Idem 2010) and aims at 
promoting a “highly competitive social market economy” and at satisfying the growing 
desire of Europeans “for more ethical and social lifestyles” (idem 2011). From the nor-
mative point of view, the SBI confirms the necessity and virtue of the current Austerity 
policies and identifies a set of transformations that the European Third Sector and 
Member States should undertake, among which the most notable are: increasing hy-
bridisation between Non-Profit and For-Profit sectors; more systematic fiscal support 
to the Third Sector;  and the creation of common frameworks for Social Impact as-
sessment.  
Secondly, I highlight the role of G8, with reference to its Task Force on Social Impact 
Investment (G8TF), launched by British Prime Minister David Cameron during his presi-
dency in 2013. The Task Force moved from a study calculating the gap, within G8 
Member States, between social needs and public budgets in next 15 years (Accenture 
2012). Data show a gap consisting of some hundreds of billions of Euros, 30 billion for 
Italy alone, and this gap is identified by G8TF as the potential for private investment in 
Welfare. The core hypothesis of the G8TF is that there are investors who can fulfil this 
potential, investing their capital – at non-speculative rates and through different 
schemes and tools – in “social impact” programmes. The TF was chaired by the presi-
dent of the leading British investment fund Big Society Capital and “brought together 
government officials and senior figures from the worlds of finance, business and phi-
lanthropy from across the G8 Countries”. It was divided into several groups focusing on 
different aspects of the issue and aims at “catalysing the development of the social im-
pact investment market” (G8TF 2013). In September 2014, after one year of work, its 
final report entitled Impact Investing: The invisible heart of the Market contained a 
number of recommendation to governments in order to “build, participate and facili-




tate the development” of a social investment market6. As in SBI, a great emphasis is 
put on the necessity for government to adopt metrics for impact measurement and to 
streamline “pay-for-success arrangements and adapting national ecosystems to sup-
port impact investment”. Together with this, it encourages the establishment by gov-
ernments and foundations of “capacity building grant programmes” in order to “boost 
social sector organisational capacity” to attract and manage venture capital (idem). 
More generally, the invisible heart of the market is the name for a paradigm shift that 
relies on the ability of the State “to attract risk capital in order to innovate the delivery 
of social services, (…) harnessing entrepreneurship, innovation, capital and the power 
of markets to do good” (idem: 42).  
Finally, in order to monitor the implementation of the G8TF recommendations, an 
association named “Social Impact Agenda for Italy” was founded in January 2016 by 
members of the G8TF Italian Advisory Board and other relevant actors in the social and 
financial sector. 
 
5.2 The State 
 
The Italian State participates in the restructuring of Welfare with actions directed 
both at the supply and at the demand side of social services, i.e both to the Third Sec-
tor and to potential “social impact” investors on the one hand and to citizens on the 
other. Looking at the supply side, a comprehensive reform of Third Sector regulation 
was approved by the Italian Parliament in May 2016 (Italian Parliament 2016). Without 
getting into the details of the whole reform, three points are significant for my argu-
ment. The first and major element has to do with the notion of Social Enterprise itself: 
the Law extends it to all Social Cooperatives (which represent the vast majority of the 
“Social Third Sector”, see infra 5.3), and calls for an assessment of their “social” nature 
through a calculation of their “social impact”, with little consideration of the quality of 
the process of the production and provision of the service (central in the original idea 
of social cooperatives). Secondly, it recommends increasing the participation 
of(reformed) Third Sector Organisations in policy making (art. 4.m). Thirdly, the reform 
lays the foundations for a deep restructuring of the mix of public and private economic 
support for the Third Sector. On the one hand, it enhances the role of Third Sector’s 
“second level” organisations as partners in policy making and therefore also in the 
management of public funding (art. 4n). On the other hand, it establishes a public 
Foundation (Fondazione Italia Sociale) aimed at attracting private funds and provide 
 
6 All quotes from the TFG8 website: (https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/social-impact-investment-
taskforce 




funding to Non-Profits (art. 10). This Foundation will be managed by a public-private 
Steering Board and will hold a great economic power over the Third Sector. Finally, the 
reform opens up access to Social Enterprise governance to representatives of private 
and public institutions (art. 6.g). The combination of these three elements suggest a 
centralization in the economic governance of the Sector, with subsequent disempow-
erment of the more locally-based and politically independent organizations.  
Beside this structural intervention of the central State, I recall three processes taking 
place at the local level exerting a strong influence on Welfare services. First, “the ex-
change of processes with controls” as tool in the relationship between local Admin-
istrations and NPOs (Fazzi 2013). That means a further bureaucratisation that results 
in: 1) impoverishing the collaboration between the different actors involved, under-
mining the possibility of coordination, evaluation and co-projecting; 2) empowering 
bigger NPOS, better equipped for dealing with the workload of further bureaucratic 
work and disempowers the smaller ones, contributing to the above-mentioned process 
of merging and “dimensional growth”.  
The second process at stake is the increasing need for NPOs to be able to co-finance 
their public funding by selling their services in the private market (De Ambrogio, 
Guidetti 2014).  
A third, significant element in this process is the huge delay on the part of the State 
in paying NPOs for the outsourced services, with a relevant impact in selecting the fit-
test (i.e. the biggest and more productive) NPOs, putting in serious trouble small coop-
eratives and associations that have an insufficient volume of business and cash-flow for 
covering their current expenses or accessing to private credit (Fazzi 2013). These pro-
cesses are mostly regulated via administrative documents (such as the text of a Tender 
announcement) or even via their silent violation (as in the case of delay in payment) 
and thus – although very relevant in political terms – they are not publicly debated and 
may be presented and perceived as “technical” issues, contributing to the neoliberal 
trend of discursive depoliticisation (Moini 2015). 
With regards to policies devoted to the demand-side, i.e. to individual citizens and 
families, the State is operating with the aim of making citizens’ private Welfare costs 
“more rational” and of keeping them under control. I argue that this activism by the 
State is to be understood as an attempt to achieve the difficult goal of developing a 
new market for Welfare services at a time of fiscal crisis for the State and of harsh eco-
nomic crisis for families. As a leading scholar in the field of the Third Sector recently 
wrote, in order to face the consequences of cutting public budgets, “it is necessary to 
pursue the recovery of social expense, especially through policy stimulating the de-
mand (fiscal incentives, vouchers)” (Borzaga 2015, 5). Several, still fragmented, 




measures in this direction have been discussed, and some of them have been ap-
proved, by the Italian Parliament in the last two years, such as the introduction of  new 
scheme for reverse mortgage (Beltrametti 2014), the establishment of a universal 
voucher (Maino 2014) and the reform of the index for calculating eligibility to free so-
cial assistance (Toso 2014). 
 
5.3 The Third Sector 
 
In this context, before discussing the strategies currently deployed by the Italian 
Third Sector, I will first refer to some fundamental data describing its current features. 
Using data from the 2011 Census of Non-Profit Organisations, I draw attention to three 
critical elements (Istat 2013). Firstly, the economic relevance of NPOs working in Wel-
fare: despite the fact that they are a minority within the Third Sector (around 30%), 
they possess and administer the great majority of funds (idem, Moro 2013). Consist-
ently with the interpretation of their impact in terms of substitution of public service, 
data show that in the period 2001-2011, for every new job in NPOs working in care, 
health and education, one job was lost in the same areas of the Public Sector. Second-
ly, a great financial polarisation exists among NPOs, between the top 5% owning 82% 
of the resources and the rest (in 2001, it was 15% owning 80% of the wealth) (idem; 
Messina 2014). Finally, considering the Social Third Sector, one should notice that it is 
currently financially dependent  on the State for 60-70% of its resources and conse-
quently it perceives the cuts in the public budget for Welfare as a great threat. Third 
Sector big players are therefore promoting two interrelated strategies. On the one 
hand, they promote an “industrialisation” of the sector (Fazzi 2013), increasingly ac-
cepting forms of outsourcing from the State which leave no space for any profit, mak-
ing economies of scale more and more crucial, but also resorting (for the first time in 
its history) to the closing and assignment of specific services and to the use of redun-
dancy pay (Fazzi 2012, 2013). On the other hand, they try to penetrate new private 
markets, spreading their investments and developing services for new target-
populations. For the moment, this is focused on investments in Social Housing (an in-
between housing sector half way between Public Housing and the private housing 
market) healthcare clinics and corporate Welfare services (Maino and Ferrera 2015). 
Looking at future developments, the debate within the sector increasingly looks at the 
opportunity of fostering partnerships with investment capital and global multi-utilities 
in order to develop forms of “social management” in the field of “common goods” such 
as water and energy (Dotti 2015). These strategies open the door to further polarisa-
tion within the Third Sector, pushing it to forge relationships with both new partners 




and a new public. With regards to partners, they include private investors with particu-
lar attention towards “patient capital” ready to be mobilised through new tools and 
schemes (see infra); with regards to the public, these are generally solvent citizens, i.e. 
people able to pay to access social services, with particular focus on the so-called LO-
HASS (a target population defined by hybrid organisation literature as Lifestyles of 
Health and Sustainability) and the “cultural creatives” (Haig, Hoffman 2012). 
The success of these strategies will, according to an influential academic and policy 
advisor (member of the Italian advisory board of G8TF), depend upon NPOs’ ability to 
significantly innovate the way they produce Welfare services (Calderini and Chiodo 
2014). The authors argue that political and economic support should be directed to-
wards promoting demand more than offer and especially towards encouraging evolu-
tionary processes in the sector which could lead to – nothing less than – a transfor-
mation in the paradigm of social work (idem). To be more specific, they point to two 
major transformations that could require (and consequently attract) massive invest-
ment capital in the field of Welfare: 1) the introduction of technology-based models of 
intervention, disrupting the traditionally labor-intensive Welfare labor market and re-
quiring significant economic investments by NPOs; 2) the spread of a “culture of pre-
vention”, especially among people able to pay, and a subsequent widening of the tar-
gets and scope of social work. Despite the fact that, looking at current developments in 
the field of European Welfare policy, one can reasonably doubt the actual impact of 
these two trends, it is worth taking into account this strategic perspective, at least for 




The relationship between finance and Welfare is not new. Traditionally based on 
credit (to both public administrations and NPOs) and philanthropic grants (mainly to 
NPOs through the activity of Foundations of Banking Origin), it is now part of the gen-
eral restructuring of Italian Welfare. In this paragraph I will address this transformation 
looking at a third, emerging, layer of this relationship – namely investment. 
A major actor in the process is represented by Italian Foundations of Banking Origin 
(FBOs). FBOs are private actors devoted to “public good”; they were created in the be-
ginning of the ‘90s, i.e. at the dawn of the first major fiscal crisis of Italian State, in or-
der to implement the privatisation of the Italian banking system: public or semi-public 
banks were privatised and FBOs became their exclusive shareholders, with a double 
task to accomplish in the following twenty years: 1) selling most of their shares in order 
to: a) modernise the Italian banking sector and integrate it into European and global 




financial markets; b) diversifying their portfolio; 2) using the profits made out of their 
portfolio to finance private and public-private initiatives aimed at public good in the 
field of culture, sport, research, environment and Welfare, mainly through grants. FBOs 
currently are worth 51 billion Euro and distribute around 1 billion Euro per year, half of 
which to Welfare-related sectors (Acri 2014). 
FBOs play a significant role in the interlink between Welfare and financial invest-
ment at different levels. I will focus in particular on Mission Related Investments 
(MRIs), quite overlooked in the literature but – I argue – very relevant in order to ap-
preciate some key transformations at work in the field. MRIs are investments following 
a “modern vision of FBO activity, consistent with a shared international orientation to-
wards the participation of investments in the pursuit of institutional goals (…), orient-
ing investments to sectors and actors qualitatively consistent with the values of FBOs 
(…). MRIs may be intended as a tool for philanthropic actors, like Foundations, for mul-
tiplying the effects of their action in targeted sectors, directing to them both invest-
ments and grants. (idem: 204) 
Their quantitative relevance is demonstrated by the fact that, while in last ten years, 
the volume of FBO grants has decreased by 45% (Acri 2014), MRIs have incessantly 
grown and, although they represent a small percentage of FBO total budgets, they al-
ready amount to four-times the total value of grants, reaching 3.6 billion Euro in 2013 
(idem). MRIs are relevant to my argument for two reasons. Firstly, using MRIs FBOs 
participated in 2003 in the privatisation of the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP), the pub-
lic bank that, since 1863 had collected citizens’ postal savings and used them to provide 
low-interest rate credit to municipal and regional governments. While the CDP is now 
on the way to becoming a sort of Sovereign Fund (Aresu 2015), the interest rate it used 
to apply to local governments’ loans is now aligned with that of private banks –allowing 
them to finally enter a new, long sought-after, profitable market, at the expense of 
public budgets (Attac 2013, 2015; Martinelli and Tricarico 2013; De Cecco and Toniolo 
2014). This is by far the least debated aspect of FBOs strategies but also, in times of 
austerity policies and fiscal crisis for Local Governments, quite a relevant one – con-
necting public budgets for Welfare, rises in public debt, private credit and restructuring 
of the field of philanthropy (Caselli 2015).  
Secondly, MRIs are – mainly but not only through the activity of the CDP – the main 
tool used by FBOs for participation in those financial opportunities opened up by the 
development of new markets for private investment: health centres, social housing 
market, private care services (see  above 5.3).  
Although fundamental, FBOs are not the only actor operating at the intersection be-
tween Welfare and finance. It is important to consider new financial actors, such as 




venture capital, to the mobilization of whom much of the effort of the above men-
tioned G8TF is devoted. The most debated instrument for financial penetration into the 
field of Welfare is that of Social Impact Bonds (SIBs), a scheme allowing Local Admin-
istrations hit by Austerity policies to receive investment from private investment funds 
in order to implement social programmes – through NPOs. These programmes have to 
be assessed by independent experts through a complex metric in order to quantify 
their social and financial impacts and – once the benefit of the programme for the Lo-
cal Administration is determined in terms of savings (the classical case is that of pro-
grammes to discourage ex-prisoners re-offending) – determine the rate of interest that 
the Local Administration must pay to the investor. While among Italian scholars and 
professionals there is no consensus on the actual space for the spread of SBIs within 
the national context (Avanzi 2013; Calderini and Chiodo 2015; Pasi 2015) and an inter-
national critical scholarship on the issue is emerging (Ogman 2014; Dowling and Harvie 
2014; Whitfield 2015), the first experimentation is taking place in Naples (Pasi 2015), 
with the financial support of Banca Prossima (part of the Banca Intesa Group), Italy’s 
most determined bank pursuing “Welfare and Third Sector innovation” (idem). 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks: emerging Welfare paradigms and scenarios 
 
I conclude my analysis returning to the questions posed in the introduction. With re-
gard to the theoretical approach, the combination of variegated neoliberalization stud-
ies, the political economy of the Welfare State and the concept of référentiel proved to 
be useful tools for analysing the current restructuring of Italian Welfare, from several 
aspects. Firstly, their articulation of a general “context of contexts” with the specifici-
ties of different geographical, institutional and policy contexts allowed me to put the 
current process of crisis and restructuring of Italian social policies into a historical and 
political perspective. Secondly, and more specifically, the  relationship between roll-
back and rollout moments in processes of neoliberalization allows me to stress the con-
tinuity between the Neoliberal and Social Investment paradigms, particularly with re-
gards to: 1) the predominance of macro-economic paradigms oriented towards public 
budget reduction, austerity and a marginalisation of social policy; 2) the re-
commodification of fields of social reproduction that tended to be absorbed by Wel-
fare State responsibility; 3) the increasing responsibility recognised to non-public ac-
tors through an active mobilisation by the State of rollout regulatory arrangements. We 
are therefore witnessing a phase which mixes up rollback and rollout elements with 
the goal of solving the crisis of legitimation that neoliberalism has been experiencing 




following the 2008 global financial crisis. This happens mainly through the fabrication 
of a new, entrepreneurial and financialized image of the Non-Profit Sector. Thirdly, and 
consequently, the three approaches proved useful in making sense of the attempt to 
develop, upon the entrepreneurial and financial restructuring of Welfare, a new hege-
monic representation of neoliberal capitalism, purportedly led by the action of the in-
visible heart of the market. Drawing upon the literature of variegated neoliberalization, 
I contest this representation, stressing: 1) the link between the destructive effect of the 
invisible hand and the creative effect of its invisible heart; 2) the active and visible hand 
of both the market and the State in fostering the conditions for the deployment of 
both the invisible hand and invisible heart of the market. 
Looking at the effects of these processes on the existing Welfare arrangement, I 
showed the crisis of the Welfare Mix balance reached in the period mid ‘90s-mid first 
decade of the 2000s, which was the result of the preceding rollout phase of the neolib-
eralization of Italian Welfare and was characterised by a system of regulated competi-
tion. This balance has been undermined by the new rollback moment of post-crisis ne-
oliberalization driven by major cuts in the national budget for Welfare. A creative mo-
ment, however has been developing, pushing NPOs to co-finance social programs and, 
as a consequence: 1) go through deep regulatory reform of the Third Sector; 2) start 
selling their services not only to the State but also to private citizens, in both their cur-
rent sectors of activity and in new ones; 3) increasingly involve private financial inves-
tors in the planning and in the implementation of social policies.  
While the results of the process are still to be determined, I offered evidence of a 
significant convergence in the direction of a new entrepreneurial and financial turn in 
Italian Welfare. For this reason – despite being aware that a radical change in the cur-
rent trend is possible (Sbilanciamoci 2014; Gori et al. 2014; Caritas Italiana 2014, 2015; 
Caselli 2015) – I conclude the article with two complementary scenarios based on the 
hypothesis of a deepening of neoliberalization in Italian Welfare.  
 
1. Smart Utopia: this scenario, expressing the Horizon 2020 Strategy and the New 
Public Governance paradigm, is based on the spread of smart, high-tech and sustaina-
ble capitalist growth led by a new enlightened and widespread global entrepreneurial 
class. From this point of view, a hybridisation between the For-Profit and Non-Profit 
sectors will result in both an ethical and economic growth, led by “socially innovative” 
entrepreneurship. Co-produced by users and providers, Welfare services will allow 
Non-Profit companies to do well while doing good. In the current context of an impov-
erishment of a growing part of the population, this utopia seems sustainable only for 
the “grey area” of the (not too) impoverished middle class, able to pay a Social Housing 




rent to live in a green and “supportive” neighborhood built by ethical Investment Funds 
and managed by a Low-Profit Organisation, be cared for in Low-Profit clinics financed 
by venture capital, and to send their children to corporate Kindergartens managed by a 
multinational hybrid Social Enterprise. On the other hand, this scenario has a blind spot 
as regards the growing number of non-paying citizens: people unable to pay who are 
directly or indirectly excluded from this utopia. The second scenario is devoted to 
them. 
2. Colonial scenario, expressing the current impoverishment of public Welfare ser-
vices and their "residualisation". It is the dark side of Smart Utopia, where “traditional” 
target populations, increasingly racialized on the basis of their social attitudes, unable 
to  obtain private Low-Profit Welfare services will be the only ones left to receive the 
degraded, residual public Welfare services (Bauman 2004, Quadrelli 2013). The same 
NPOs working in Smart Utopia will provide (and possibly co-finance) the “poor Welfare 
for the poor” (Titmuss 1968) needed to take care of the “wasted lives” of the non-
paying citizens. The historically ambivalent swing of Welfare States between empow-
erment and repression will stop at the second element of that ambivalence, as services 
will be characterised by strict eligibility criteria for clients’ access; an increasingly high 
ratio of clients for social worker; massive recourse to voluntary and low-skilled em-
ployees; temporary and unstable work conditions for professional social workers 
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